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ABSTRACT 
Public sector union membership rolls will swell by over 40,000 
Transportation Security Officers (TSO) as the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) embarks on transitioning to a unionized screener workforce. 
Proponents argue that screening operations will be in jeopardy as poor 
performing screeners will be difficult to remove for cause, attention will be 
focused on union issues rather than security measures, and the threat of work 
slowdown or unofficial strikes if union demands are not met could have 
nationwide economic repercussions. The TSA organizing as a unionized 
workforce has parallel similarities to another unionized aviation industry federal 
agency—the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO). 
Disgruntled with years of attempted bargaining between PATCO and the Federal 
Aviation Association (FAA), PATCO staged an unofficial work strike in August 
1981 that temporarily halted air traffic in the United States. As airlines were 
forced to cancel flights, this strike brought national attention to the impacts that 
federalized workers can have on national security and the economy. Federal 
agencies with national and homeland security responsibilities must remain 
operationally agile. The economic devastation resulting from a TSA work strike 
could potentially cripple the complex transportation network of aviation, rail, 
pipeline, highway, cargo, maritime and mass transit. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Public sector unions have experienced a significant increase in 
membership over the past three decades, despite many federal and state laws 
that restrict the rights of public and private sector unions and limit their ability to 
collectively bargain for employees. As public sector unions gain membership 
strength in numbers and resulting revenues, their political clout and influence 
over policy and legislative decisions also increases. The legislative decisions that 
can result from this influence have critical financial impact on federal budgets and 
state treasuries as these government entities struggle to fund the salaries, 
benefits and pensions of their public employees. Proponents of collective 
bargaining for public sector employees claim high membership rates of 
firefighters, police officers and emergency response workers and argue that 
union membership has no negative impact on their ability to secure the 
homeland. Opponents of collective bargaining for public sector employees 
counter-argue that lengthy and costly negotiating processes will compromise 
national security, which will decrease the nation’s ability to respond effectively to 
natural disasters, emergency situations and terrorist threats. The Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) will test these opposing arguments in the coming 
years as it transitions to a unionized federal workforce with collective bargaining 
rights, the results of which could negatively impact homeland security and unduly 
influence aviation commerce in America through job action that would not likely 
occur had TSA remained union free.  
B. ARGUMENT 
Public sector collective bargaining arguably presents an aberration of 
good governance and is unnecessary as the potential harm from job action 
outweighs the benefits accrued to employees through the collective bargaining 
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process. The primary difference between public sector unions and private sector 
unions is that the former negotiates collective bargaining agreements directly 
with the government officials to whom they pay campaign contributions, while the 
latter lobby government officials, make campaign contributions to elected 
officials, but suffer the leveling influences of free market processes. Collective 
bargaining in the public sector provides a disproportionate benefit to government 
workers through this corrupting political influence and, as such, is arguably an 
aberration for good governance. 
The right to union representation and collective bargaining in public sector 
employment varies among federal, state and local governmental enterprises. 
Proponents of collective bargaining rights claim union representation does not 
impact employees’ ability to respond to disasters and security situations and 
creates an empowered workforce. Opponents, including Senators Kay Bailey 
Hutchison (R-TX) and Jim DeMint (R-SC),1 counter that negotiating with union 
bosses before implementing security changes, work schedules and 
compensation will cause significant damage to security effectiveness through 
delayed response times, threat of work strike or slowdowns, inability to remove 
poor performing employees and bureaucratic negotiating for grievance 
procedures and compensation allowances.. By 2009, for the first time in the 
history of public unions, more government employees were represented by 
unions than were union workers in the private sector, 7.9 million and 7.1 million, 
respectively (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010).  
Federal employees are not prohibited from joining a union, regardless of 
the agency for which they work or their position within the government. 
Inconsistencies exist, however, among federal agencies with regard to collective 
bargaining rights. Traditional first responder federal agencies, such as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Secret Service, do not grant 
                                            
1 Statement released March 2007: “Collective bargaining among TSA screeners would 
jeopardize safety because it would take away TSA’s flexibility to respond quickly to security 
threats.” 
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collective bargaining rights to its employees while Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) employees have collective bargaining rights. Prior to enactment 
of The Homeland Security Act of 2002, components of CBP existed in several 
legacy agencies without collective bargaining rights. The U.S. Capitol Police are 
unionized, as were many of the 9/11 first responders. By contrast, the TSA 
expressly prohibited collective bargaining rights until the 2011 decision by 
Administrator John Pistole.  
These rights vary even more significantly among individual states. 
Approximately 26 states allow collective bargaining for all state and local 
workers; 12 states have collective bargaining for some state and local employees 
while the remaining states do not allow collective bargaining for their public 
sector workers. Likewise, 22 states are considered “right-to-work” states whereby 
workers cannot be forced to join a union or pay fees for collective bargaining 
protections.2  
Despite strong federal and state laws that limit or prohibit the degree of 
negotiating power afforded to unions that represent public sector workers, these 
unions have experienced a dramatic increase in membership within the past 
decade. This growth in public sector unionization is despite the fact that courts 
have generally upheld the ruling that public sector employees do not always 
enjoy all the union privileges that private sector employees have under the 
Wagner Act of 1935 and its amending legislation.  
The public sector union member rolls will potentially swell by over 40,000 
Transportation Security Officers (TSO) to the TSA in 2011. The potential impact 
of TSA’s unionization on homeland security is under scrutiny as TSA embarks on 
transitioning to a unionized screener workforce. TSA Administrator Pistole set 
                                            
2 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming.  
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specific and non-negotiable terms3 and strongly stood behind his position that 
TSA labor structures will not compromise national security. Despite these 
limitations on areas, such as security procedures, pay and work schedules, 
proponents argue that screening operations will be in jeopardy as poor 
performing screeners will be difficult to remove for cause, attention will be 
focused on union issues rather than security measures, and the threat of work 
slowdown or unofficial strikes if union demands are not met, could have 
nationwide economic repercussions.  
Public sector unions employ strategic marketing techniques to solicit 
membership aggressively through claims of increased morale, lower attrition and 
improved work schedules. However, the cyclical process only increases the level 
of political influence—increased membership equals increased revenues, which 
in turn, equal increased political contributions that translates into continued 
bargaining with the elected officials who received the lion’s share of union 
campaign contributions.  
As organized labor has gained strength in the public sector, the burden to 
finance the collective bargaining agreements falls to the taxpayers. Although this 
financial burden is mostly felt at the state and local levels, more and more federal 
employees are seeking organized labor representation, as demonstrated in the 
TSA’s nine-year finally successful battle to gain exclusive union representation 
and collective bargaining rights. The challenge for lawmakers is how to continue 
to fund these costly collective bargaining agreements without sacrificing 
homeland security efforts given that many political campaigns receive significant 
financial support from many of these unions. The conflict for citizens and  
 
                                            
3 These exclusions include pay and policies affecting pay, security policies and procedures, 
deployment of security personnel, deployment of equipment and technology, job descriptions and 
qualifications, fitness for duty standards, performance standards and staffing, annual certification 
requirements, testing and consequences of failure to certify or recertify, means and methods of 
covert testing and use of results, any action deemed necessary by the Administrator or designee 
to execute the agency mission during emergencies, disciplinary standards and penalties, and 
internal security practices.  
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democratic processes are the influence that union bosses have over political 
appointees and lawmakers because of the significant campaign contributions and 
political support afforded to the candidates that hold union favored status. 
This political collusion achieved by public union leaders and elected or 
appointed officials enables union bosses to have a privileged position with 
politicians through the collective bargaining process. Political officials are elected 
to represent the interests of their constituents. Negotiating constricted work 
environments, higher pay and benefits, all of which will cause taxes to increase, 
is not a fair representation of all taxpayers. At the state and local level, public 
sector unions can virtually select the politicians who will sit at the bargaining table 
to enact contractual terms in favor of the very people who contributed significant 
amounts of money to their political campaign. Union bosses negotiate directly 
with these elected officials to gain increased wages and benefits at the expense 
of federal and state budgets.  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The overarching goal of this research project is to provide an overview of 
the collective bargaining environment in the public sector, particularly at the 
national level, with a focus on the potential ramification of a unionized TSA 
workforce on homeland security.  
As the TSA embarks on its execution of transitioning to a unionized 
workforce with collective bargaining rights, this research provides a compendium 
of history, legislation, statistics, facts and opposing views for agencies, such as 
the TSA, and for future research efforts focused on exploring the impact and 
implications of current events surrounding public sector union activity. With 
increasing public awareness of the high cost of aviation security and increasing 
Congressional inquiries surrounding security effectiveness, this research can 
provide insight into the potential benefits and risks of a unionized federal security 
workforce. 
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Public sector unions have significant influence over government policies 
through their aggressive lobbying efforts, particularly in states that allow 
monopoly unionization. To what extent this political influence has on the 
negotiation of salary, benefits and arbitration rights and how this influence affects 
disaster and emergency response times are potential supporting indicators 
warranting further research. Additionally, the unions are marketing themselves as 
attractive and necessary voice for public employees. This attraction for union 
representation is gaining momentum, despite the fact that federal worker rights 
and management limitations are clearly defined in numerous federal laws and 
Executive Orders, which prohibit workers from striking and unions from 
negotiating salary, benefits, schedules and security procedures. The driving 
force(s) behind this attraction and the resulting consequences are compelling 
research opportunities. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What was the rationale behind the TSOs’ push for exclusive union 
representation with collective bargaining rights? 
2. To what extent will TSA’s unionized workforce potentially impact 
homeland security, particularly aviation security, and the national 
economy? 
3. To what extent has this rise in public sector union membership 
contributed to the critical state of fiscal issues facing the federal 
government? 
E. BACKGROUND 
In the wake of 9/11, President George W. Bush signed H.R. 5005, which 
provided authority for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). Through this historic legislation, the country would now have one 
overarching agency whose mission was to prevent, protect, respond to and 
recover from events of national significance. The new department was an 
amalgamation of 22 agencies and offices that held common cause in existing 
security missions.  
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Citing concerns of national security, President Bush announced his intent 
to invoke his authority under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (5. U.S.C. 
Section 7103 (b))4 to prohibit this new 170,000 employee agency from collective 
bargaining, many of whom had such rights under their previous agency 
agreements. Controversy arose from all sides as opponents claimed President 
Bush was pushing his anti-union agenda while proponents argued that the bill 
would not eliminate all collective bargaining rights. The political atmosphere was 
sharply divided on the subject, as the Administration was in favor of no collective 
bargaining while the members of Congress from the Democrat Party wanted 
DHS employees to be able to choose. 
As part of the DHS, aviation security would now fall under the 
responsibility of the newly created TSA. The 2001 Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act gave TSA its own authority to decide whether or not to engage in 
collective bargaining with its employees. On January 8, 2003, Under Secretary 
for Transportation Security Admiral James Loy, issued a written memorandum 
prohibiting TSOs from engaging in collective bargaining as a condition of their 
employment with the TSA. This policy became known as “The Loy Directive.”5 
Significant debate over both the legality and basis of The Loy Directive ensued 
and continued unresolved until April 2011.  
In late 2002, TSOs at La Guardia Airport, Baltimore-Washington 
International Airport, Pittsburgh International Airport and Chicago Midway Airport 
petitioned the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to grant approval to form 
                                            
4 The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 includes a provision (5. U.S.C. Section 7103 (b)) 
authorizing the President to exclude an agency or subdivision from the ability to collectively 
bargain if the primary function of the agency is intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or 
national security work and if applying the labor-management provisions of the act would be 
inconsistent with national security requirements. 
5 The Loy Directive: “By virtue of the authority vested in the Under Secretary of 
Transportation for Security in Section 111(d) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(ATSA), Pub. Law No. 107-71, 49 U.S.C. § 44935 Note 2001, I hereby determine that individuals 
carrying out the security screening function under section 44901 of Title 49, United States Code, 
in light of their critical national security responsibilities, shall not, as a term or condition of their 
employment, be entitled to engage in collective bargaining or be represented for the purpose of 
engaging in such bargaining by any representative or organization.”  
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local union chapters of the American Federation of Government Employees 
(AFGE). Secretary Loy issued his prohibitive memorandum in response to this 
petition. Despite a dissenting vote from (now Chairperson) Carol Waller Pope,6 
the FLRA ruled against the TSOs, citing the Secretary’s authority to determine 
collective bargaining rights and the petitioners’ failure to provide evidence that 
the Loy Directive was unconstitutional (59 F.L.R.A).  
Disagreement arose from all sides of the collective bargaining issue. 
During his 2008 presidential campaign, then-Senator Barack Obama proclaimed 
his support of collective bargaining in a written promise to the AFGE president, 
John Gage (B. Obama, personal communication, October 20, 2008): “If I am 
elected President, I will work to ensure that TSOs have collective bargaining 
rights and a voice at work to address issues that arise locally and nationally.” In 
her testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation 
Committee, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, declared her support of collective 
bargaining and belief that it can be accomplished in such a manner as to not 
compromise any aspect of security.7  
President Obama attempted to nominate several new TSA administrators 
shortly after his election in 2008. Senator Jim DeMint used his senatorial 
privilege in 2009 to put a hold on the confirmation of TSA administrator nominee 
Erroll Southers, citing Southers’ support of collective bargaining for TSA 
employees. During Southers’ confirmation hearing, Senator DeMint opined that 
TSA required the “flexibility to make real-time decisions that allowed it to quickly 
improve security measures in response to this attempted attack.” Senator DeMint 
further declared that union leaders with collective bargaining powers would be 
able to “veto or delay future security improvements at our airports.” Southers was 
                                            
6 “The majority does not explain why it interprets [§111(d)] to permit [TSA] head to eliminate 
employees’ right to organize under the [ATSA].” 
7 In her testimony on December 2, 2009, “Transportation Security Challenges Post-9/11.” In 
response to the question asked by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, “Let’s start on the collective 
bargaining issue. What is your view about the effort to have collective bargaining among the 
transportation security administration screeners and personnel?” 
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the President’s second attempt at nominating a new leader for TSA. Earlier that 
year, retired Army major General Robert A. Harding was nominated for the 
position. He later removed himself from consideration.  
Previously banned from union representation under TSA’s “Loy Directive,” 
newly appointed TSA Administrator, John Pistole, rescinded the Loy Directive. 
After careful consideration of the facts and effects, Administrator Pistole 
announced his decision on February 4, 2011 to allow TSOs to hold an election to 
determine the extent of support for collective bargaining in the agency. This 
election was the largest federal labor election in U.S. history, with over 48,000 
TSA employees eligible to vote, which surpassed the previous record held by 
NTEU in 2006. By virtue of Mr. Pistole’s decision, on April 15, 2011, TSOs were 
afforded the opportunity to cast closed-ballot votes for one of three options: 
Exclusive representation from AFGE, exclusive representation from National 
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), or no union representation. Neither AFGE 
nor NTEU received a clear majority vote; a run-off election was held, resulting in 
victory for AFGE. After nine years of collective bargaining prohibition, TSOs 
elected AFGE as their exclusive representative. TSA and AFGE have entered 
into the initial stages of establishing the guidelines and parameters to begin 
collective bargaining procedures. 
The TSA organizing as a unionized workforce has parallel similarities to 
another unionized aviation industry federal agency—the Professional Air Traffic 
Controllers Organization (PATCO). Disgruntled with years of attempted 
bargaining between PATCO and the Federal Aviation Association (FAA), PATCO 
staged an unofficial work strike in August 1981 that temporarily halted air traffic in 
the United States. As airlines were forced to cancel flights, skeleton crews of 
non-striking controllers, supervisors and military air traffic controllers were 
deployed to handle the remaining air traffic. Moreover, it brought national 
attention to the impacts that federalized workers can have on national security 
and the economy. Travelers were reluctant to fly, flights were cancelled or had 
minimal passengers onboard as the public lost trust in the safety of air travel.  
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The parallels between PATCO and the TSA are striking. The TSA would 
find itself in similar territory should the AFGE-backed TSA workforce engage in 
similar job action. Supervisory TSOs, who are not part of TSA’s bargaining unit, 
and therefore, not covered under the collective bargaining unit, could be pulled 
into service to replace the striking screeners, airlines could cancel flights, and 
Americans could lose trust in air travel security.  
During the presidential campaign in 1980, candidate Ronald Reagan 
proclaimed his support of labor unions by issuing a letter to members of PATCO 
announcing his commitment to address their grievances. In August 1981, over 
12,000 members of PATCO staged an unauthorized nationwide strike that 
temporarily halted and nearly brought down the air traffic control system in the 
United States. Angered over decades of outdated systems and unsafe working 
conditions, members of PATCO entered the unauthorized strike with hopes that 
President Ronald Reagan would support their cause and address their 
grievances. President Reagan won the support of PATCO members during his 
presidential campaign by promising to address their issues. However, within 48 
hours of the start of the strike, President Reagan ordered all controllers back to 
work. Only 10% returned and the remaining air traffic controllers were fired and 
banned from future federal employment.  
In Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers and the 
Strike that Changed America, Joseph McCartin (2011) describes the incentive 
behind the strike and the events that led to PATCO’s demise. Prompted by the 
December 16, 1960 fateful collision of United Airlines flight 826 and Trans World 
Airlines flight 266 over New York City that killed all 128 people on both flights, the 
PATCO set the course for two decades of voicing their concerns to the FAA over 
outdated systems, stressful work conditions and processes that did not keep 
pace with the increase in air traffic. PATCO President Robert Poli presented a list 
of 97 grievances and demands to the bargaining table with FAA management, 
among them the request for higher pay, better working hours and increased staff 
to keep up with the increased demand. A few months later, FAA management 
 11
countered with their final offer of a $2,500 pay increase for each controller, a 
15% pay increase for night differential and a 30-minute lunch break. PATCO 
refused the offer and staged an unofficial work strike on August 3, 1981. The 
strike lasted only 48 hours; however, McCartin claims the results set the stage for 
the decline in labor/management relations and a political paradigm shift in labor 
union support for several decades.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Substantial research exists to support and counter the arguments and 
issues presented from independent “think tanks,” such as The Cato Institute and 
the Center for Economic and Policy Research to publications, such as The 
Washington Post and The Economist. The published literature that addresses the 
history, laws, benefits and disadvantages of public sector unionization is as vast 
as the issue itself. From published opinions to Congressional testimony, from 
federal statues to state laws, debating the collective bargaining rights of public 
sector employees is not a one-size-fits-all discussion. National statistics on both 
public and private sector union membership, demographics, occupations and 
wages are provided through the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), U.S. 
Department of Labor. While the fundamental right of union representation for 
public employees is not at issue,8 dissecting the “union issue” further reveals 
regulations and laws that prohibit certain components of union representation, 
such as collective bargaining, state statutes that allow collective bargaining but 
not for public employees (states of Virginia and North Carolina), and federal 
limitations based on agency of employment. Coupled within these disparate rules 
is the caveat that defines a state’s union status—“right-to-work” states versus 
union states. 
The Center for Economic and Policy Research’s report titled, “The Wage 
Penalty for State and local Government Employees,” compares the wage 
earnings of state and local government employees against private sector 
employees with similar positions. Conversely, USAToday reporter Dennis 
Cauchon reports that based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
federal workers’ average pay in 2009 totaled $123,049 compared to private 
sector employees’ earnings of $61,051. Union labor is more expensive than 
                                            
8 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 (29 U.S.C. §§ 151) established the right 
of workers to engage in collective bargaining; however, it exempted certain workers. The Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978 provided federal workers the right to collectively bargain.  
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private sector non-union labor. The ramifications of this premium labor price rests 
on the backs of taxpayers rather than on consumers who have a choice if they 
buy a product or not. The taxpayer has not choice—taxes must be paid and 
elected representatives are depended upon to protect their interests. If these 
elected officials, particularly in Congress, do not provide adequate stewardship 
for the resources provided by taxpayers, then taxpayers must pay an inordinate 
price for services that might be curtailed at the whim of the union and its 
members.  
In the Fall issue of National Affairs (2010), Daniel DiSalvo provided a 
detailed account of advantages that public sector unions enjoy over their private 
sector counterparts and the significant influence that collective bargaining 
provides to the union bosses. A similar example of political clout is that unlike 
private sector unions, public sector unions have a “privileged position” with 
politicians through the collective bargaining process. Furthermore, the author 
brings to light his three categorical effects of public sector unionization: 
compensation, size of government and lastly productivity and efficiency. DiSalvo 
presents three primary reasons for the substantial spike in public sector unions 
and their influential power over the collective bargaining process: weakening of 
party machines, economic and demographic changes, and the organized 
coalition between public sector unions and the Democratic Party.  
Joseph McCartin (2011) provides a balanced account of the 1981 
unauthorized work strike staged by 12,000 members of PATCO and the 
subsequent firing of those controllers who refused President Reagan’s order to 
return to work. McCartin details not only the events that led up to the nationwide 
strike; his central argument is that the PATCO strike led to the decline of private 
sector unions’ membership and power. “Yet while the PATCO strike did not 
cause American labor’s decline, it acted as a powerful catalyst that magnified the 
effects of the multiple problems that beset American unions. It did do because it 
had such a dispiriting psychological impact on workers” (p. 361). This case study  
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is critical to understanding the potential impact that a similar nationwide strike 
could have on national security, should the unionized TSOs decide to pursue that 
avenue.  
 16
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is a qualitative exploratory study of the public sector union 
arena, to examine the potential impact to homeland security, rationale behind the 
significant increase in public sector union membership, the political influences 
behind increased union membership and the corresponding conflicts of interest, 
and the correlation between public sector union collective bargaining agreements 
and increased financial burdens to taxpayers. This analysis begins with the 
history of organized labor unions in America to demonstrate the foundation by 
which laws were influenced and mandated and union-supported mindsets 
evolved. The author provides examples of individual states with strong union 
membership and political influence and corresponding taxpayer financial burden, 
and presents PATCO as an historic reference and the TSA as a case study to 
identify the recent union membership surge at the federal level and discuss 
relative factors, influences and challenges facing the TSA. To demonstrate the 
nationwide impact of collective bargaining, case studies at the state and local 
levels are presented as supporting contextual evidence.  
Substantial evidence and data exist by which to research the overarching 
issue of why public sector employees are joining unions and the risks and 
consequences to homeland security. Specifically, this research is focused on four 
primary categories: potential impact to homeland security, political implications 
and risks, financial considerations and rationale for joining a union. First, second 
and third order effects are used to further evaluate the consequences of public 
sector membership increase on homeland security. 
First order of effect: Public sector union membership has increased over 
the past decades to where these unions have a 7.9 million membership 




This significant increase has a critical impact on homeland security. Third order 
of effect: This significant increase has critical financial threats to the U.S. 
economy. 
Each area is analyzed from both a historic and a present-day perspective, 
by examining events and conditions that may point to a rationale for the 
substantial increase in public sector union membership. Other factors, such as 
the possible correlation between public sector employees’ union status and the 
impact on the effectiveness in responding to security and disaster situations, are 
critical and worthy of research consideration; however, sufficient data is lacking 
to conduct a thorough and comprehensive analysis.  
Recommendations are based on the priority of these analyses. If the 
evidence supports the author’s assumption that political implications rank a 
higher priority than legal considerations, her recommendations for supporting this 
option may come at the price of non-support of the other criteria. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. PAST ENVIRONMENT 
1. Federal Labor Legislation 
The National Labor Relations Act (NRLA) (also known as The Wagner Act 
of 1935) is the foundation by which employees are guaranteed “the right to self-
organize, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively, 
through representatives of their own choosing.” (29 U.S.C.A. § 157, Section 7). 
Conversely, the NRLA provides employees with the right to “refrain from any or 
all such activities” if they so choose. The underlying premise of the NRLA is to 
prohibit employers and unions from committing unfair labor practices that would 
violate these rights and prohibit employers from engaging in discriminatory or 
retaliatory acts against its workers based on their union status. The NRLA does 
not protect collective bargaining rights of federal and state employees, nor does it 
pertain to railroad and airline industries, whose rights are protected under the 
Railway Labor Act of 1926 and amended in 1936 to include airline employees. 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), responsible for the operational 
aspects of the NRLA, represents the rights of private sector workers by 
processing their petitions to form or decertify a union, investigates complaints 
against union and employers, and facilitates settlements. The NRLB cannot 
assess penalties; rather it aims for “make-whole” remedies such as back pay for 
employees.  
DiSalvo (2010) points out that during this time period, public sector 
unionization was a subject for which most Americans and politicians were not 
supportive. A staunch supporter of labor unions, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(F.D.R.) understood the potential ramifications that collective bargaining for 
government workers could have on the country. DiSalvo believed that F.D.R. 
understood that the collective bargaining process could not be applied to public 
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servants. "Meticulous attention," the president insisted in 1937, "should be paid 
to the special relations and obligations of public servants to the public itself and 
to the Government. The process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, 
cannot be transplanted into the public service." F.D.R. believed that "[a] strike of 
public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to obstruct 
the operations of government until their demands are satisfied. Such action 
looking toward the paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support 
it is unthinkable and intolerable."  
The Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947 in an attempt to loosen many of 
the limitations on employers and to increase the limitations on union by 
disallowing jurisdictional strikes and union secondary boycotts. The act also 
granted individual states the authority to pass right to work laws and gave federal 
courts enforcement jurisdiction over collective bargaining agreements. Under this 
act, states covered by the NRLA could elect to be either a “closed shop” state in 
which employees must be union members as a condition of employment, an 
“open shop” state whereby workers had to join the union after a minimum time 
period, an agency shop state where workers were not required to officially join 
the union but must pay union dues, or a right-to-work state that outlaws the 
forced payment of union dues and membership. Right to work states are also 
known as “open shop” states.  
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 was created to explicitly grant 
federal employees the right to collectively bargain and offer protections granted 
to private sector employees covered under the NRLA. However, the NRLA failed 
to establish clearly what specific powers states can and cannot impose and 
which state laws the Congress can and cannot preempt with regard to labor 
relations. Historically, this distinction has been left to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which has established two fundamental principles, federal statute cannot 
preempt all state labor laws, and any conduct protected by federal statute is 
immune from state law. At the federal level, Congress is considering a National 
Right to Work Bill that would restrict states from requiring employees to join a 
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union or pay union dues as a condition of employment. Opponents of right-to-
work laws argue that all employees benefit from the collective bargaining terms 
without the burden of paying union dues, which they argue, drives down the 
power of the collective bargaining process and subsequent agreements and 
leads to lower wages and benefits for all employees. 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Title VII, created the Federal Labor 
Relations Agency (FLRA). This independent federal agency has direct 
responsibility over resolving unfair labor practice complaints, resolving 
negotiation impasses, determining the appropriateness of units for labor 
organization representatives, and adjudicating legal issues relating to duty to 
bargain and exceptions to arbitrator’s awards for those federal employees who 
are represented by unions. By comparison, the NLRB represents the rights of 
private sector workers by processing their petitions to form or decertify a union, 
investigates complaints against union and employers, and facilitates settlements. 
The NRLB cannot assess penalties; rather, they aim for “make-whole” remedies, 
such as back pay for employees.  
2. Public Sector Unions 
Public unions did not exist until around 1956 when New York mayor 
Robert Wagner (whose father authored the Wagner Act of 1935) allowed some 
city employees to organize (Siegel, 2011). During his re-election campaign in 
1961, having lost the support of the party leaders in New York’s five boroughs, 
Wagner turned his attention to the public section unions to fuel his political drive. 
President John F. Kennedy took notice of Wagner’s victory and sought to also 
obtain public employees’ support for the Democratic Party, and in 1962, issued 
Executive Order 10988 that gave federal workers collective bargaining rights 
(Siegel, 2011). Federal unions gained official statutory status in the late 1970s 
with the Civil Service Reform Act, which created the framework and rules for 
labor management relations in the federal government. The law is usually 
referred to as the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Statute 
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(FSLMRS) and is now in Chapter 71 of Title 5 US Code. Congress also created 
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to oversee labor relations in the 
federal civil service. Significant differences exist between federal and private 
sector labor relations law and practices including the following.  
1. Union membership is voluntary in the federal service. Under private 
sector rules abiding by the NLRA, a company may require union 
membership as a condition of employment. Whether a federal 
employee pays union dues as a member or not, a representative 
union must represent all employees. 
2. Federal unions cannot negotiate over wages and economic 
benefits, such as retirement; holidays, sick or annual leave, or 
overtime pay.  
3. Federal unions do not have the right to strike or engage in 
concerted activities like slowdowns, picketing, or sickouts.  
4. Federal management reserves certain rights not afforded to the 
private sector. For example, federal management has the right to 
assign duties to any job and to contract out and lay people off.  
3. Collective Bargaining Process 
Once a public sector agency votes to elect exclusive union representation 
and the election results are certified by the NLRB, union members and agency 
leaders are required to bargain in good faith to reach an agreement. This process 
may take years to complete, as evidenced by the CBP and NTEU. In 2003, 
several federal agencies consolidated into the CBP. This unique amalgamation 
brought together a workforce ranging in professions from customs agents to 
agriculture Inspector who were represented by several unions with collective 
bargaining agreements. After eight years of contentious negotiations, in May 
20112, the CBP and NTEU reached agreement on a comprehensive collective 
bargaining agreement that outlines in detail terms under which each entity must 
perform and the specific rights of all parties.  
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A collective bargaining agreement9 is the ultimate goal of the union and its 
members. Negotiating for its members’ interests is how union officials prove their 
worth to their dues-paying members. Collective bargaining is the result of months 
and often times, years of negotiating to reach consensus on mandatory terms of 
employment, such as wages and hours. Whether or not a term of employment is 
a mandatory negotiating point is highly debated and extremely subjective. While 
the courts have attempted to define “mandatory,” it is commonly accepted to 
include issues that “settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer 
and the employees” (Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Company, 1971). Regardless of the definition, neither the 
organization nor the union may refuse to bargain over a mandatory term of 
employment. To do so is considered an unfair labor practice and all parties are 
required by law to bargain in good faith.  
4. Transportation Security Administration 
The 2001 Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) gave TSA its 
own authority to decide whether or not to engage in collective bargaining with its 
employees. By exercising his authority under Section 111(d) of the ATSA, Under 
Secretary Loy specifically and explicitly prohibited TSOs from engaging in 
collective bargaining as a condition of their employment, under the terms of The 
Loy Directive.10 While TSOs, like all federal employees, have the right to join a 
union, the Loy Directive explicitly prohibits their right to collectively bargain. 
                                            
9 Collective bargaining agreements cannot establish that which federal or state law prohibits. 
They typically address wages, schedules, and grievance procedures. Legally binding, these 
agreement can be costly for future generations o taxpayers.  
10 The Loy Directive: “By virtue of the authority vested in the Under Secretary of 
Transportation for Security in Section 111(d) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(ATSA), Pub. Law No. 107-71, 49 U.S.C. § 44935 Note 2001, I hereby determine that individuals 
carrying out the security screening function under section 44901 of Title 49, United States Code, 
in light of their critical national security responsibilities s, shall not, as a term or condition of their 
employment, be entitled to engage in collective bargaining or be represented for the purpose of 
engaging in such bargaining by any representative or organization.” 
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On November 26, 2008, President George W. Bush signed Executive 
Order 13480 excluding subdivisions of the Department of Energy, Homeland 
Security, Justice, Transportation and the Treasury from the application of United 
States Code, Title 5, Chapter 71, citing the considerations of national security. 
Stating its inconsistency with national security requirements, in 2008, President 
George W. Bush invoked this privilege through Executive Order 13480 (Exec. 
Order No. 13480, 2008) that prohibits law enforcement, intelligence and national 
security federal employees11 from collectively bargaining. Many of the agencies 
affected by the order had collective bargaining rights, only to have them removed 
through the execution of the order. The TSA, however, was regulated under the 
ATSA, which gave the TSA Administrator sole discretionary power to prohibit 
collective bargaining as a condition of employment. Every TSA Administrator 
from 2002 to 2010 sustained this authority and prohibited collective bargaining 
for TSOs. Newly appointed Administrator John Pistole invoked his discretionary 
authority in 2011 and reversed the prior prohibition on collective bargaining.  
Past presidents have likewise invoked their respective authority. President 
Jimmy Carter signed into law Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 that 
limited the scope of collective bargaining agreement to personnel practices. Title 
VII also denied federal employees the right to participate in workplace strikes, 
limited their ability to participate in picket lines for informational purposes only, 
and required union representation votes to be conducted under secret ballot 
procedures. Title VII was tested on August 3, 1981 under President Ronald 
Reagan’s helm, as PATCO declared a nationwide strike in protest over salary, 
schedules and working conditions. President Reagan immediately ordered all 
13,000-air traffic controllers back to work, calling the strike a “peril to national 
security.” Two days later, President Reagan fired the 11,000 controllers who did  
 
 
                                            
11 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, The United States Coast Guard, Department of 
Energy, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal Air Marshal Service, Federal Aviation 
Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
 25
not return to work and banned them from future federal employment. This 
banishment remained in place for 12 years until President Bill Clinton repealed 
the order in 1993.  
B. CURRENT ENVIRONMENT 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, by 2010, 36.2% (7.6 million 
employees) of all public sector employees belonged to a union, compared to only 
6.9% (7.1 million employees) of private sector workers. Further dividing these 
figures, local government workers represented the highest union membership 
rates with 42.3%, primarily due to heavily unionized industries, such as teachers, 
police officers and fire fighters (Bureau of Labor and Statistics, 2011).  
The states with the largest share of unionized public sector workers are 
also the states that require collective bargaining (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2010). For example, New York leads the nation with 70.5% of its public sector 
workers belonging to a union, followed by Connecticut and Rhode Island with 
64.4% and 62.1%, respectively; all of which require collective bargaining for its 
public sector workers. These “blue”12 states have active “agency shop rules” that 
require workers to join the union or pay a fee to the union. Conversely, right-to-
work “red” states, such as North Carolina, Louisiana and Mississippi, have the 
lowest population of public sector workers in unions, each with less than 10% of 
their public sector employees belonging to unions. Currently, in the 22 right-to-
work states, workers are not required to join the union or pay union dues. Many 
of these states have laws that outright ban collective bargaining for their public 






                                            
12 The terms red states and blue states were made popular in 2000. Red states symbolize 
voters who tend to vote for the Republican Party, while blue states tend to vote for the 
Democratic Party. 
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Table 1.   States with Highest and Lowest Percentage of Public Sector Union 
Members (From: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010) 
Highest Membership Rates 
State Union Membership 
New York 70.5% 
Connecticut 64.4% 
Rhode Island 63.7% 
Massachusetts 62.1% 
New Jersey 59% 
Lowest Membership Rates 
Virginia 10.8% 
Arkansas 10% 




With large populations of union constituents and strong collective 
bargaining laws, political appointees may be heavily swayed to cast their votes in 
the interests of the unions that represent their citizens. Public sector unions 
negotiate and bargain with the elected officials of the state and union dues are 
filtered to those political campaigns. As a result, the labor market is skewed in 
that wages and benefits are voted on by the very people who negotiated with the 
union bosses who contributed the majority of the union dues to their campaigns. 
These agency shop states permit the coerced payment of union dues in that 
whether a worker wants union representation or not, the worker must pay union 
dues that often times may go to support a political candidate whom the worker 
may not embrace. 
C. FIRST ORDER OF EFFECT: POTENTIAL THREATS TO HOMELAND 
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
Prior to the catastrophic events of 9/11, aviation security was the 
responsibility of the individual airlines and airports across the country. The TSA 
was formed, in part, because the national government felt that private screening 
had failed America in a number of airports. Despite collective bargaining support 
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from President Obama and DHS Secretary Napolitano, key members of 
Congress were not convinced that collective bargaining would not impact security 
responsiveness and contribute to future failures. Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison 
(R-TX)13 and Jim DeMint (R-SC) have publically voiced their opposition to 
collective bargaining based on its impact on security measures, responsiveness, 
and potential for workforce strike or slowdown. In her opening statement before 
the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, Senator 
Hutchison declared her stance on collective bargaining, “While federal law, of 
course, prohibits screeners from striking, allowing screeners to collectively 
bargain through a union could have serious consequences on the Transportation 
Security Administration’s fundamental security mission.”  
Federal agencies with national and homeland security responsibilities 
must remain operationally agile and flexible in response to emerging threats and 
conditions. Security measures, response and recovery policies and processes 
and emergency scheduling adjustments should be made based on national and 
homeland security needs, and cannot wait while union representatives and 
agency management attempt to reach consensus. The potential risk exists of 
creating an atmosphere whereby security measures are decided based on the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement and potential of resulting in 
perceived unacceptable working conditions or additional employee labor hours. 
The FBI, CIA and Secret Service all prohibit collective bargaining for their 
employees to sustain a readily responsive workforce. 
The economic devastation resulting from a TSA work strike, slowdown or 
similar job actions would potentially cripple the complex transportation network of 
aviation, rail, pipeline, highway, cargo, maritime and mass transit, over which the 
TSA has direct authority. This multi-modal transportation network is critical to the 
nation’s economic vitality, interconnecting the country with manufacturers, 
                                            
13 Statement released March 2007: “Collective bargaining among TSA screeners would 
jeopardize safety because it would take away TSA’s flexibility to respond quickly to security 
threats.” 
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supplier, merchants and passengers through approximately 4 million miles of 
public roadways, more than 140,000 miles of active rail, 600,000 bridges and 
tunnels, more than 350 maritime ports, hundreds of thousands of pipeline, 15 
million daily passenger on mass transit and passenger rail systems, over 9 
million cargo containers through 51,000 port calls, 25,000 miles of commercial 
waterways, 19,576 general aviation airports, heliports, and landing strips and 459 
federalized commercial airports. A work stoppage at any one of these critical 
nodes would halt all security measures along the nation’s transportation network, 
and cause economic domino effects of supply shortages and price increases, 
halt of cargo at critical ports and create massive airline flight cancellations.  
The economic impacts of a transportation security strike would be felt on a 
global scale. According to the Air Transport Action Group (ATAG) aviation 
transports over 2 billion passengers each year, 40% of whom are international 
tourists. In additional to passenger travel, economic benefits of air travel enable 
globalization of world markets. Products and goods transported by air represent 
35% of all international trade. This vital industry produces over 32 million job 
throughout the globe, and supports 2,000 airlines that operate fleets of 23,000 
aircraft (Air Transport Action Group, 2008). 
Despite legal and contractual prohibitions against strikes, government 
workers have staged unauthorized work strikes and slowdowns. Unionized 
airport screeners in Toronto, Canada staged a work slowdown during 
Thanksgiving 2006 to protest the terms of their contract. Screeners caused 
massive delays at checkpoints and baggage locations when they hand-inspected 
all checked baggage and carry-on luggage during these busiest days for air 
travel, which caused massive delays. Under pressure from the airlines to avoid 
further flight delays, authorities allowed over 250,000 passengers and bags onto 




Predicting the probability of a work strike or slowdown is not possible. 
However, the consequential impact can be foreseen. When comparing the 
similarities between PATCO and the TSA, conclusions can be drawn that warrant 
recognition. For example: 
1. The FAA’s inability or unwillingness to grant salary increases, 
scheduling adjustments and better working conditions that were in 
keeping within PATCO’s demands.  
2. The FAA had a monopoly over the hiring and training of air traffic 
controllers nationwide. Controllers had no choice but to work for the 
federal government if they wanted to be that occupation. Likewise, 
the TSA has a monopoly over aviation security and hires and 
training its own workforce. TSA’s Screening Partnership Program 
(SPP), mandated by ATSA, allows airports to “opt out” of 
federalized screening by applying through the TSA, which has the 
final decision. In 2011, the SPP program was temporarily halted. 
3. Technology advancement played a critical role in PATCO’s 
dissatisfaction with the FAA. Emerging technology allowed more 
airlines to fly greater numbers of routes, which in turn, created 
additional demands on the controllers in terms of longer working 
hours, more stressful conditions and staffing levels that did not 
keep pace with the increased flight schedules. Similarily, TSOs are 
consistently tasked with learning new technology and operating 
new equipment, such as the recently-deployed Advanced Image 
Technology, which is designed to improve explosive detection 
rates. Emerging technology must keep pace with the emerging 
threats. TSOs will consistently be asked to keep pace with this 
demand, similar to the air traffic controllers’ situation.  
4. To continue the mission of protecting the nation’s transportation 
systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and 
commerce, the TSA requires the necessity to remain agile and 
flexible with regard to changing security procedures to mitigate the 
changing threats to homeland security. For example, when the 
British authorities discovered the plot in August 2006 by terrorists 
attempting to bring down aircraft bound for the United States using 
liquid explosives in sports drink bottles, the TSA adjusted its 
security measures within 24 hours of the known threat by restricting 
all liquids from entering its checkpoints. Changing policies and 
procedures to direct these security mitigation efforts, developing 
and deploying the requisite training to 45,000 TSOs and monitoring 
compliance at over 700 TSA-controlled security checkpoints around 
the country cannot happen without the authority to direct these  
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effects immediately and responsibly. The ability to make these 
decisions without regard to union conflict or employee grievance is 
a fundamental component of maintaining a security presence.  
As the TSA begins transitioning to a unionized screening workforce, the 
impact of the collective bargaining agreement between the TSA and AFGE on 
public safety will begin to unfold. The potential for overall aviation security to 
stagnate while bargaining over working conditions and performance issues take 
precedence over passenger safety is a critical vulnerability. Bellante, Denholm 
and Osoria (2009) argue these work strikes and similar job actions implemented 
by public sector employee unions deprive the taxpayers of government-
monopolistic services for which they have paid. As strikes loom, society will 
demand a solution from their elected officials, who may give in to the unions’ 
demands as a short-term solution. This imbalanced influence gives unions the 
propensity to dominate the political system and reap the rewards of increased 
government size and scope.  
D. SECOND ORDER OF EFFECT: POTENTIAL FINANCIAL THREATS TO 
HOMELAND AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen has 
often opined that the U.S. economy is a greater risk threat to the United States 
than both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Carden, n.d). As state and local 
lawmakers struggle with balancing the need for continued or additional 
government services to its citizens with the challenge of sustaining a balanced 
budget, legislators will look toward federal grant monies to subsidize the current 
and future fiscal shortfalls. The DHS provides federal grant monies to states to 
augment security and preparedness efforts. From 2002 through 2011, the DHS 
has awarded more than $32.1 billion in state and local preparedness grants, 
which represents approximately 32% of states’ operating costs. DHS grants in 
2011 earmarked for state and local homeland security efforts have decreased by 
25% from 2010, which means a $780M reduction in funding that support state 
and local level initiatives. DHS grants provide substantial funding aid for 13 
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programs14 that include assistant to firefighters grants, emergency management 
grants, port and transit security grants, and emergency operations grants. In 
FY2011, $528M was awarded to the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) 
to assist states in identifying planning, organization, equipment, training, and 
exercise needs at the state and local levels to prevent, protect against, respond 
to, and recover from acts of terrorism and other catastrophic events. In 
accordance with the 9/11 Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53), states are required to 
dedicate a minimum of 25% of SHSP towards law enforcement terrorism 
prevention-oriented planning, organization, training, exercise, and equipment 
activities, including those activities that support the development of fusion center 
capabilities. To augment their homeland security efforts and meet the 9/11 Act 
law enforcement requirements, high-threat urban areas can apply for SHSP 
monies under the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program, which received 
$662M in FY2011 federal funds. Urban areas are categorized as high-threat 
areas based on DHS risk mitigation criteria.  
1. Homeland Security Funds 
The 2009 House and Senate set aside $300 billion in stimulus money, 
which was targeted primarily to avoid the layoffs of 2.8 million federal and 17 
million state and local public sector employees. This money source will run dry in 
2012 and leave many states to find alternative funding solutions for their 
expensive collective bargaining agreements, and more importantly, leave the 
American citizens with compromised security, emergency response and 
protection services. The impact will be felt at every level, none more so that at 
                                            
14 List of Programs for FY2011: Assistance to Fire Fighter Grants $810M, Driver’s License 
Security Grant Program (DLSGP) $45M, Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) 
$329M, Emergency Operations Center (EOC) $14M, Freight Rail Security Grant Program 
(FRSGP) $7.7M, Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP): State Homeland Security Program 
(SHSP) $526M, Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) $662M, Operation Stonegarden (OPSG) 
$54M, Metropolitan Medical Response Grants (MMRS) $34M, Citizen Corps Program (CCP) 
$9.9M. Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP) $4.9M, Intercity Passenger Rail Security 
Grant Program (IPR) $22M, Non-Profit Security Grant Program (NSGP) $18.9M, Port Security 
Grant Program (PSGP) $235M, Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP) 
$14M, Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) $200M, Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program 
(THSGP) $10M. 
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the state and local levels, as these respective legislations scramble to find 
alternatives to their rising liabilities and shrinking revenues, which, according to 
the Wall Street Journal (Mullins & McKinnon, 2010) are at pre-recession levels. 
The impact of these reduced DHS grant monies is being felt at the state 
and local levels. The City of Trenton, New Jersey reduced its 350-member police 
officer force by 33% in a strategic move to save over $4 million toward its city 
budget shortfall. The remaining police force began working overtime hours to 
maintain a minimum level of community police presence; however, Mayor Tony 
Mack cut the overtime allocation and ordered police officers to maintain their 
regular schedules. The mayor’s hotly contested decisions received staunch 
criticism. City Councilman and former Trenton police officer George Muscal 
proclaimed Mayor Mack had “signed the death sentence” to the people of 
Trenton, as “people are going to go wild” (Zdan, 2011). Trenton, like several 
major New Jersey cities, relied on state funds to supplement their local budgets, 
which accounted for 25% of Trenton’s annual fiscal funds. In 2010, Trenton 
received approximately $55 million from the state coffer; in 2011, that amount 
was virtually cut in half to $27 million. Cities throughout New Jersey made 
equally difficult decisions; Newark cut 15% of its police force in 2010 while the 
City of Camden reduced its police presence in the state’s most crime-ridden city. 
These and nine other New Jersey cities received a last minute cash infusion of 
$21 million in federal grant monies spread over three years that will enable 
Newark to re-hire 25 police officers, while Camden, which laid off almost one half 
of its police force and one third of its firefighters, will use its $3.8 million share of 
the UASI federal funds to return 14 police officers to the city streets.  
2. Privileged Positions 
The political influence achieved by public unions enables union bosses to 
have a privileged position with politicians through the collective bargaining 
process. Public sector unions, certainly at the local and state level, can virtually 
select the politicians who will sit at the bargaining table to enact contractual terms 
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in favor of the very people who contributed significant amounts of money to their 
political campaign. Union bosses negotiate directly with these elected officials to 
gain increased wages and benefits at the expense of federal and state budgets. 
The cyclical process only increases the level of political influence—increased 
membership equals increased revenues, which in turn, equals increased political 
contributions, which translates into continued bargaining with the elected officials 
who received the lion’s share of union campaign contributions.  
In private sector collective bargaining agreements, wages and 
compensation negotiations are conducted between the union representatives 
and the corporate decision makers. To compensate for these additional 
personnel costs in a free market economy, companies will raise prices, cut back 
on goods or services, or eventually lay off workers because the market bears 
these costs of increased wages and compensation. If the market does not 
support these increased prices or reduction in goods or services, consumers in a 
competitive market simply stop purchasing them or find an alternative source. 
Consequently, private sector unions have an intrinsic motivation to bargain in 
good faith and fairness to what the market will bear. 
When public sector unions bargain for increased wages and 
compensation, the taxpayers bear the entire cost of these liabilities without the 
benefit of any voice in the matter. To pay for these increased costs, governments 
raise taxes and/or cut services in other areas. Taxpayers cannot simply stop 
using public services (e.g., utilities, schools, fire and police protection) as these 
monopolistic services exist without market competition. If the market will not bear 
the cost of these increased wages and benefits for public workers, governments 
struggle to find alternatives solutions, which often results in layoffs and 
diminished public services. Yet, the cost to the taxpayer remains at the inflated 
rate under the collective bargaining agreement for which they had no part in the 
outcome. Additionally, these wage and retirement liabilities are set at the rate 
determined under the collective bargaining agreement for many years to come, 
and in many states, remain untouched under legislative rules.  
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The potential political influence over the union agreements is more 
problematic at the state and local level, in that unions contribute directly to 
lawmakers and elected officials who may and often times do become bosses 
over the very public employees whose union dues supported their respective 
campaigns. Additionally problematic is the very nature in which collective 
bargaining agreements are negotiated. At this level, union bosses negotiate 
directly with these lawmakers and appointed officials, to whose campaigns the 
union contributed the revenues derived from union dues, which provides 
government employees direct access to the legislative decision makers with 
control over their terms of employment and compensation, a privilege not 
afforded to private sector union members. This conflict of interest can be taken a 
step farther at the local level, where mayoral and city council candidates can 
dangle the proverbial carrot in front of union bosses with the implied threat of 
citywide layoffs or difficult and lengthy collective bargaining negotiations. Unions, 
on the other hand, can also play their hand over the officials whom they helped 
elect by threatening to withhold future campaign dollars and support. Throughout 
this cat-and-mouse game, the public employees are required to pay union dues 
whether or not they choose to belong to the union. In essence, they are directly 
contributing their money to support political campaigns that they may not 
endorse.  
3. State and Local Concerns 
Public sector unions are bankrupting this country, according to Steven 
Greenhut (2009) who compares public sector unions to lobbyists by aggressively 
fighting for their own gain that comes in the form of increased union membership 
and dues and subsequent revenues for the union. Through his research of 
several state treasuries, Greenhut claims that public service unions should be 
banned as states like his native California fund enormous pension and 
compensation liabilities, amidst a severe budget crisis. In a state in which a 
highway patrol officer can retire at age 50 with a retirement pension equal to 90% 
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of the officer’s salary and over 9,000 retired public sector employees have annual 
pensions in excess of $100,000, Californian’s faced the year 2010 with over a 
half trillion dollars in unfunded liabilities. Contributing to this excessive debt is the 
technique known as “pension spiking” in which state employees can grant 
themselves a bonus or falsely inflate their salary prior to retirement to receive a 
higher pension annuity, which is calculated based on the employee’s salary set 
prior to retirement. The taxpayers who now must pay retirement benefits to an 
employee based on an artificially inflated salary feel the affects of this salary 
spiking.  
As the State of Wisconsin faced a $3.6 billion shortfall in 2011, 14 
Democrats senators fled to Illinois in protest over Governor Scott Walker’s belt-
tightening Budget Repair Bill, which among other items, included limitations on 
state workers’ collective bargaining privileges, many of which were negotiated 
between union representatives and the Democratic-controlled legislature whose 
campaigns received millions of dollars from the state employee unions. The 
Wisconsin Democracy Campaign reported these 14 senators have raised $1.9 
million since 2007 election cycle, of which public sector employees contributed 
over $344,000. Faced with this significant budget shortfall, Governor Walker’s 
proposal took a strategic approach to implement several new measures that 
addressed the actual cash shortfalls and some of the laws that contributed to 
these financial challenges to ensure fiscal sustainability for future years. 
Governor Walker took on the immediate financial crisis by reducing the interest 
rate on Wisconsin’s current debt, proposing cost-cutting measures to reduce the 
burden of collective bargaining agreements on taxpayers, and ensuring fiscal 
sustainability for future out years.  
Wisconsin’s Budget Repair Bill would end automatic payroll deductions for 
union dues paid by public employees and allow public workers to opt out of 
paying these mandatory union dues. Additionally, the bill would repeal the current 
authority that grants childcare workers and University of Wisconsin faculty and 
hospital employees collective bargaining benefits. Governor Walker’s proposal 
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also included cost-cutting measures, such as restricting collective bargaining for 
wages that exceed the rate of inflation, and requiring public workers to increase 
their contributions to pay for health insurance and retirement pensions. In 
addition to the significant $68M the state pays to subsidize teachers’ health care, 
the teachers union collective bargaining agreement requires local school districts 
to purchase their health coverage through the union-affiliated health insurance 
plan, called the WEA Trust. Governor Walker is asking employees to contribute 
5% toward their pensions, an amount in line with the national average; and a 
premium payment of 12%, which is half the national average. These changes 
alone are expected to save Wisconsin taxpayers over $30 million during the last 
months of the 2011 fiscal year alone. Governor Walker’s rationale is that asking 
state employees to contribute to their retirement pensions at a rate equal or less 
than their private sector counterparts is fair and equitable. These and other 
budget cuts will allocate funds to pay for Wisconsin’s $170 million Medicaid tab, 
which was not included in the previous year’s budget. By restructuring the current 
debt, Governor Walker’s proposal lowered the current interest rate that would 
save an additional $165 million of the taxpayer’s money. To ensure these budget 
changes continue to return financial results to the out years, the proposed 
legislation provides provisions for limiting many costly collective bargaining laws. 
For example, state government employees, with the exception of local police, fire 
and state patrol officers, can continue to collectively bargain for wages; however, 
the law will restrict negotiations over other forms of employment compensation.  
Opponents of Governor Walker’s collective bargaining restrictions argue 
that he is moving Wisconsin toward a right-to-work state by removing the historic 
laws that granted these vast and expensive union arrangements. Proponents 
counter that continuing down the same path that contributed to the expensive 
liabilities would be catastrophic for current and future Wisconsin taxpayers. This 
strategy was a significant risk for Governor Walker by taking on the union 
mindset established decades ago, as Wisconsin became the first state in the 
nation to grant collective bargaining rights to its state employees.  
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Changing a culture embedded in history is never an easy task. The state 
of Wisconsin has enjoyed its union shop status for decades, which is supported 
by lawmakers whose campaigns and careers directly benefited from these 
unions’ existence and influence. Citing the Governor’s firm stance against the 
costly collective bargaining agreements and need for hard decisions, McCartin 
(p. 365) credits the power of PATCO with changing Wisconsin’s pro-union 
climate. “That episode revealed how powerful the ghost of PATCO remained 
thirty years after the controllers’ strike.”  
Collective bargaining agreements not only demand increasingly generous 
wage and benefit packages, they increase tax rates and drive budget deficits 
even higher. As the money well of private sector union membership continues to 
dry, unions are aggressively seeking new revenues in the form of public sector 
union dues. Union dues come from government salaries, which in turn, go to 
support certain political campaigns and politicians directly, who, in turn, propose 
and vote for legislation that directly benefits the government employees. 
According to Glenn Spencer, Executive Director of the Workforce Freedom 
Initiative, “public-sector unions have a guaranteed source of revenue – you and 
me as taxpayers” (Mullins & McKinnon, 2010).  
As homeland security grant money allocated directly to states and local 
municipalities’ declines in the near future, states will be severely impacted and 
burdened with finding sustainable funding for their homeland security initiatives. 
Coupled with the insurmountable financial weight of funding hefty collective 
bargaining agreements, state legislatures will be forced to make hard decisions 
to address the scarcity of resources and economic uncertainty. 
4. Union Contributions to Political Campaigns and Interests 
Public sector unions are incented to grow government, raise workforce 
numbers and benefits, and increase influence in government. To do this, they 
lobby members of Congress, who, in turn, authorizes funding for federal 
employees. This systemic cycle was studied (Freeman, 1986; Valetta, 1989, 
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Spengler, 1999) and its results analyzed at North Carolina State University 
(Twiddy & Leiter, 2003) where the researchers concluded that, while the specific 
causes of this cycle may be unclear, the Spengler study discovered that strong 
union influence over the political arena increased the demand for municipal 
services, which in turn, increased the number of workers needed to sustain these 
increased government services.  
On April 13, 1992, President George Bush signed Executive Order 12800 
(a.k.a. the Beck Order)15 that required federal contractors to notify its employees 
of their rights pertaining to joining unions and their right to object to the use of 
their union dues for purposes other than collective bargaining, contract 
administration and grievance adjustment. President Bush’s Executive Order 
informed federal contractor employees of their rights and discretion to control 
union political campaigns generated from union dues. This order effectively 
granted non-union federal contract employees a refund of their union dues used 
to support political activities. White House official estimated the order could 
potentially strip $2.4 billion in annual union money available for political activities. 
On the other hand, unions counter that amount is inflated and claim they spend 
less than $1 billion on yearly political activities. President Bill Clinton rescinded 
EO 12800 shortly after taking office in 1993, and claimed the order was “distinctly 
anti-union.”  
As the exclusive representative for over 45,000 TSOs, the AFGE stands to 
collect almost $18M in annual TSA union dues. Union membership dues 
represent the main revenue to the union that historically contributes a significant 
portion of this revenue into political contributions to elected officials,16 who have 
positional power to vote for union interests, such as salary and benefit increases 
                                            
15 See Communications Workers of America v. Beck Communications Workers V. Beck, 487 
U.S. 735 (1988). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that employees required to pay union dues under 
the NLRA cannot be required to contribute to the union’s partisan political activities. The union in 
question had contributed almost 79% of Mr. Beck’ union dues to support the Democratic Party. 
16 During the 2010 presidential election year, AFGE contributed 97% of its revenue to the 
Democratic Party. 
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and pension benefits. These increases, however, are funded through tax 
increases. Over the long run, these increased benefits carry an added burden to 
the federal budget and state treasuries in pension and retirement liabilities for 
generations of taxpayers. These out-of-proportion liabilities skew already 
stressed federal and state budgets, and pushes them toward insolvency. To 
highlight this point, recent analysis indicates that states may be holding as much 
as $1 trillion in unfunded benefit liabilities with many states’ funding levels well 
below the 80% level (Public Sector Pensions: Unsatisfactory State, 2009). As 
AFGE’s membership rose from approximately 200,000 in 2002 to over 280,000 
by 2010, their assets and revenues also increased, which enabled them to 
contribute larger portions of their finances to political causes. In 2010, AFGE 
recorded over $103 million in total Income and over $47 million in total assets. Of 
their $101 million in 2010 spending, $4 million was spent on political activities 
and lobbying (Federal Elections Commission by Way of the Center for 
Responsive Politics, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1.   AFGE 2010 Spending (From: Federal Elections Commission by 
Way of the Center for Responsive Politics, 2011). 
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Between 2003 and 2010, 75% of AFGE’s political contributions were given 
to Democratic candidates at the state level, with no financial contributions given 
to any Republican, non-partisan or third-party candidates. Nationally, AFGE’s 
Political Action Committee (PAC) collected over $4.2 million and has contributed 
98% of these funds to the Democratic Party (Federal Elections Commission by 
Way of the Center for Responsive Politics, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2.   AFGE Political Action Committee Contributions (From: Federal 
Elections Commission by Way of the Center for Responsive 
Politics, 2011). 
In early 2011, the Senate defeated a measure that would essentially halt 
the TSA from conducting a vote to decide if they wanted to unionize or not. In a 
51–47 vote, the measure was defeated. The Washington Examiner reported, 
“senators voting against the amendment received on average $17,404 from 
contributions connected to federal employee unions while senators in favor only 
received on average $2,633” (Tapscott, 2011). 
The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME) holds the position of contributing the largest amount of political 
campaign support for the 2010 election cycle. The AFSCME is not only the 
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largest public sector union in the United States17, boasting a 1.6 million 
membership roster, it outspends its rival unions, such as the AFL-CIO, with $87.5 
million in campaign spending to support the Democratic Party, of which $16 
million came from their “emergency account” to increase advertising efforts of 
Democratic Congressional members whose seats were up for re-election. The 
AFSCME dubbed this strategic push their “218 Strategy,” named after the 
number of seats necessary to sustain Democratic control of the House of 
Representatives. These significant efforts targeted toward a national campaign 
advertising tactic were coupled with the AFSCME’s $2.2 million contributions to 
57 individual politicians’ campaigns, many of whom the AFSCME snubbed in 
previous elections. Their rationale, according to Larry Scanlon, head of 
AFSCME’s political operations, is “Let’s get people re-elected and work to 
change their votes. It’s not a perfect world” (Mullins & McKinnon, 2010). At the 
state level, the AFSCME was the largest contributor to the Democratic Governors 
Association and Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee, which donated 
$5M to elect Democratic governors. As a whole, public sector unions contribute 
to the Democratic Party at a rate of 96%, versus 4% to the Republican Party.  
DiSalvo considers rising costs to be the biggest challenge facing state and 
local lawmakers. If they do not bring rising wage and pension costs under 
control, the liability for taxpayers, in its current state of crisis, will grow 
exponentially for future generations. As federal funds continue to run dry, states 
cannot simply turn on the printing press, DiSalvo argues. Unless collective 
bargaining agreements are either halted or their power minimized, the financial 
burden to taxpayers will reach staggering heights.  
Proponent arguments of public sector unions include the progressive view 
that increased public services and regulations equates to increased public sector 
jobs. Steven Attewell of The Realignment Project (Attewell, 2010) staunchly 
defends public unions and disputes many of the published and assumed 
                                            
17 The AFSCME consists of 3500 local unions, which represents 1.4M members. 
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statistics that proclaim their influence over political decision makers and burden 
on taxpayers in the form of increased wages and retirement benefits for public 
workers. Attewell argues that public unions are the “yardstick for the private labor 
market” in that private sector companies can exploit their employees more easily 
through meager health plan and retirement benefits without strong causal 
representation in the bargaining process, which he claims, is evidenced in the 
fact that 37.4% of public sector employees are union members, compared to 
7.2% of private workers. Blatantly absent from Mr. Attewell’s analysis is the fact 
that this 37.4% membership rates includes those employees in union shop states 
who are required by law to pay union dues whether or not they chose to belong 
to the union.  
E. RATIONALE FOR JOINING A PUBLIC SECTOR UNION 
Despite federal and state laws that prohibit or limit the terms over which 
unions can negotiate, federal employees seek union representation for a variety 
of reasons; specifically, the need to be a voice in the decision-making process. 
As early as 2002, the AFGE and NTEU began marketing their benefits to TSOs 
by focusing on the issues in the forefront of news media, public concern and 
those expressed by the TSOs themselves. The unions were listening to what the 
TSOs had to say, which is a critical element in the rationale for seeking union 
representation. Winning the nine-year battle over exclusive union representation 
was not only a psychological morale booster for the TSOs, but it sent the 
message that TSA leadership had not been listening to their concerns for many 
years.  
1. Wage Debate 
A common theory for why public servants would be enticed to join a union 
despite strong laws that limit negotiable terms is that public employees earn 
higher salaries and benefits than their private sector counterparts. This theory 
has been researched and tested by various think tanks and independent studies 
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to determine the validity of this assumption and determine if the wage dispute is 
correlated with collective bargaining agreements. According to the Bureau of 
Labor and Statistics, total compensation for union workers rose higher than non-
union workers at a ratio of 1:42, with union members receiving 31% higher 
wages and 68% additional benefits, such as health insurance and pensions. The 
argument that government employees earn substantially more than private 
employees is both supported and disputed by a variety of studies and scholars 
(Kearney, 2001; Freeman, 1986). In the Kearney study, Kearney (2008) argues 
that while public sector unions in general are successful in obtaining wage 
increases for its members, these wages are often regulated by state and local 
laws and influenced by budgetary and economic climates. Considering all 
factors, public sector union employees have not achieved significant wage 
increases over their non-unionized peers. 
According to the Center for Economic and Policy Research study written 
by John Schmidtt published in 2010, public employees pay a wage penalty in 
comparison to their private sector counterparts (Schmidtt, 2010). Schmidtt based 
his claim on three overarching categories in which public and private sector 
employees differ: education, age and gender. According to his study, based in 
part on data from the Census Bureau’s Current Population Study of 2009, over 
50% of all state and local employees have a four-year college education and 
23% have earned advanced degrees compared to their private sector peers 
whose four-year and advanced degree rates were 29.8% and 8.9%, respectively. 
The median age for local public sector workers was 44 years for local public 
workers and 43 for state workers compared with the private sector median age of 
40 years. Gender also factored into Schmidtt’s analysis and findings, 60% of 
state and local employees, compared with 46% in the private sector. Educated 
and older workers, Schmidtt claims, tend to have higher salaries than younger, 
less educated employees. Although his research showed that state and local 
workers, on average, earned 13% more than their private sector peers in 2009, 
when conducting a side-by-side comparison of public versus private sector 
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workers with similar educational qualifications and years of experience due to 
age, public employees actually earn less than their private sector colleagues.  
Trinity University’s labor economist David Macpherson supports this 
hypothesis and suggests that when conducting a side-by-side comparison, public 
employees’ compensation is not substantially higher than their private 
counterparts, due primarily to the education factor. Since public sector workers, 
on average, have advanced degrees, these high-skilled public sector workers in 
fact earn less than the private sector. In his study, Macpherson et al. (2002) 
examined three sources of wage and compensation data: Employment Cost 
Index (ECI), Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC), Current 
Population Survey (CPS) to arrive at their conclusion that “there has been closing 
in the union-nonunion wage gap since the mid-1980s, but the magnitude of the 
closing is anything but clear.”  
Some economists argue that the value of retirement pensions and 
healthcare coverage are understated when conducting comparative studies; 
therefore, public workers earn substantially more than their counterparts. 
Additionally, they make the argument that public employees work significantly 
fewer hours than their private sector peers, which ultimately drives up the value 
of their wages. A 2010 survey conducted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
revealed that benefit packages appear to be the primary culprit that pushes 
public sector compensation far above private workers. Using Bureau of Labor 
and Statistics data, the survey concluded that variables, such as number of hours 
worked, and undervalued retirement and healthcare benefits, have been omitted 
by previous studies, and when factored into the equation, substantiate the 
argument that public employees earn more than their private sector peers.  
2. Psychological Theories 
Surveys by the Bureau of Economic Analysis show that public workers’ 
annual compensation—salary plus benefits—is higher on average than private 
sector workers, and suggest that the gap is growing. Surveys by the Bureau of 
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Economic Analysis show that public workers’ annual compensation—salary plus 
benefits—is higher on average than private sector workers, and suggest that the 
gap is growing. Surveys by the Bureau of Economic Analysis show that public 
workers’ annual compensation—salary plus benefits—is higher on average than 
private sector workers, and suggest that the gap is growing. Applying socio-
psychological theories of human behaviors can help explain some of emotional 
factors that may influence workers to join unions. Humans have basic 
physiological needs for food and shelter. Socio-psychological senses drive these 
basic needs even further to want a sense of security, companionship, individual 
and group belonging, and recognition. When an employee feels these basic and 
advanced needs are not being met, and that management is not hearing them 
and their input and ideas are not being considered, unions can fill these voids by 
representing the collective group interests through the bargaining process. The 
extent to which unions are capable of providing this sense of security and 
meeting these socio-psychological needs can be further explored and explained 
with the Exit/Voice/Loyalty (Hirschman, 1970) theory and Negativity Bias theory. 
Exploring these theories and applying them to the TSA case study and increased 
public sector union membership as a whole may further explain the deeper 
psychological factors behind the attraction of union membership. 
Numerous independent and academic studies have been conducted to 
dissect the gender, economic, cultural and geographic demographics of union 
membership in attempts to further understand the predispositions of employees 
who may seek union membership as a means to fulfill these psychological 
needs. Writing for The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Martin M. 
Perline and V. R. Lorenz (1970) conducted a literature review of the influencing 
factors of trade union participation. In their article, they opine that the extent of 
individual demographics and psychological variables dictate that “no one school 
of thought, however, can claim a complete monopoly of insight into this area 
since the factors influencing participation are numerous” (p. 425). They further 
argue that class consciousness plays an active role in the decision to join a 
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union, whether as a member of the working class or the desire to help those in 
that category. Conversely, this class consciousness perception diminishes once 
union membership is established. In other words, once becoming an active union 
member, class consciousness is replaced with several other group-related 
psychological influences, such as the desire for an active voice and active 
participation. Often, the very vocal and outgoing personality will find union 
activism a natural fit for their “desire to obtain personal power, recognition or 
financial gain” (p. 427).  
In addition to exploring the individual traits of union members, Perline and 
Lorenz also examined the union influence over its members. They argue that as 
the union expands its membership rolls, it also produces a wider gap between 
union members and its leaders. This gap can be explained, in part, because as 
the union leaders’ role expands due to increased union size, so increases 
allegiance to the union and its objectives, which are now viewed by the leader 
from a much broader, strategic perspective. Union members only identify with the 
union when it is successful in delivering on its promises (e.g., increased wages, 
lower health care costs, and premium retirement benefits). The union leader is 
also concerned with these objectives; however, loyalty belongs to the union as 
an organization with its separate goals, such as increased public image and 
reputation. The crux of Perline and Lorenz’s literature review concludes that 
individual characteristics do influence whether or not an employee is likely to 
seek union membership; however, doubt remains as to characteristics are 
interrelated. The authors suggest the need for additional research into the design 
of these variables to understand further the correlation between individual and 
group psychological variables and union organizational design.  
At the federal level, and specifically the case of TSA, if screeners cannot 
bargain over pay, schedules, procedures, and uniforms, what, then is the point of 
fighting the eight-year battle for union representation? Conversely, if all TSA 
screeners are covered by the collective bargaining agreement, regardless of their 
union membership status, why then would someone pay union dues and receive 
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the identical benefits as non-paying employees? At the state and local levels, if 
legislation, regulations and mandates expressly limit or prohibit the manner in 
which unions can represent their members, why, then, would an employee pay 
membership dues to a union? 
Numerous unions claim common benefits to union membership, most 
notably, many claim to have successfully bargained for increased wages and 
benefits, lower health care premiums, enhanced retirement pension annuities 
and workplace safety. Founded in 1918, the International Association of Fire 
Fighters (IAFF) is one of the oldest and longest-standing public sector unions in 
the country. This organization claims intangible and tangible benefits to union 
membership. In 2006, the IAFF published a document that details the benefits 
and advantages of IAFF membership, which specifically outlines its successes in 
getting legislation passed at the state and local levels and obtaining significant 
grant money to fund homeland security training and equipment purchases. At the 
local level, IAFF Local 27, representing Seattle’s firefighters, has backed up 
these stated benefits with actions. Faced with a $56M budget shortfall in 2010, 
Local 27 agreed to forego its 2% cost-of-living salary increase to eliminate 
proposed cuts in fire services. This compromise between Local 27 and Seattle’s 
elected officials is estimated to save $6.6 million of the taxpayer’s money over 
two years. IAFF Local 27 union representatives and city officials have had a long-
standing amicable relationship, despite the union’s political clout with elected 
representatives.18 Union President Kenny Stuart summarized this unique 
partnership in a press release issued on August 10, 2010, in which he stated, 
candidates or officials interested in seeking the endorsement of Seattle Fire 
                                            
18 IAFF Local 27 Mission Statement: “Seattle Fire fighters care about the service we provide 
to the citizens of our community, as well as about the safety and well-being of ourselves and our 
families. A Seattle Fire Fighter typically serves the citizens of Seattle for 20–30 years while many 
elected officials may come and go. We have been around long enough to understand that many 
times these elected officials make decisions that are not in the best interest of fire fighters or the 
citizens we serve. Oftentimes these decisions can have serious consequences. Our aim is to 
build relationships with these elected officials, ensure that they understand our issues, and work 
to guarantee that both public safety and fire fighters are always a top priority” (Seattle Fire 
Fighters Union, Local 27, n.d.). 
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Fighters may contact the Local 27 Political Action Committee (PAC) (Seattle Fire 
Fighters Union, Local 27, 2010). The PAC provides questions to the applicants 
and, based on the responses, provides endorsements recommendations to the 
general membership of Seattle Fire Fighters Local 27. 
1.  What is their position on firefighter issues and public safety? 
2.  Are the candidates organized and do they have a solid 
written campaign plan to win the election? 
3. Are they raising the necessary funds to finance a successful 
campaign? 
Once endorsed, candidates or officials can be provided with campaign 
donations (in accordance with state and local laws), press releases, volunteers, 
sign-making assistance, phone banking, as well as independent expenditures for 
literature production and distribution, print ads, and radio and TV ads. 
“Seattle Fire Fighters are totally committed to protecting the citizens of 
Seattle. Fire Fighters chose to take a cut in pay to make sure that vital 
emergency services are not cut instead” (Seattle Fire Fighters Union, Local 27, 
2010). Both IAFF and Seattle’s elected officials are to be credited with minimizing 
the political influence and union hard-handedness by instituting collaborative 
negotiations focused on reaching a common ground. Both groups credit the 
successful results to working with each party to establish and maintain an 
amiable working group geared toward compromise and balance.  
Without argument, many unions support their members through similar 
efforts aimed at improving the quality of workplace and compensation systems 
through collective bargaining. Wages in line with skills and education retirement 
funds that will ensure annuity monies are safely available upon retirement are 
successful selling points for marketing union advantages and may account for a 
portion of the recent increase in public sector union membership, especially at 
the state and local levels where union representatives have the capability to 
bargain directly with the key decision makers. 
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At the federal level, these advantages are not as easily bargained. Unions, 
therefore, look to other avenues to market the advantages of union membership. 
For example, the AFGE and NTEU actively solicited and recruited TSA 
employees by focusing on the issues in the forefront of news media and public 
concerns, such as the controversial Advanced Image Technology (AIT) that 
captures a millimeter wave image of the passenger’s entire body and the 
resolution pat down procedures considered by some as an invasive search of 
their body without probable cause. Since its initial rollout in 2009, the AIT has 
received continued negative press from national news media, privacy groups and 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which fought, unsuccessfully, to ban 
the AIT deployment on the grounds of undue search and seizure.  
After the launch of the AIT equipment and implementation of the new pat 
down procedures, passengers began recording their screening experiences and 
posting the video on various social media venues, such as YouTube and Face 
Book. TSOs found themselves in the precarious position of having their every 
move recorded, publically scrutinized, and in some cases, legally challenged. In 
2011, the State of Texas legislation attempted to pass legislation that would 
make TSOs criminally liable for conducting pat down procedures by charging 
them with sexual assault. This bill was not passed; however, the negative press 
and implications remained. Under the negativity bias theory (Ito, Larsen, Kyle 
Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998), people pay more attention to and give greater 
credence to negative information. Over time, this negative information will 
overtake the positive information and change people’s perception of themselves 
and/or the event.  
The AFGE counted on the negativity bias factor by understanding that the 
media focuses on the negative factors associated with the TSA and that these 
negative events or actions have a tendency to remain predominant in the minds 
of those listening. The AFGE has actively enticed TSOs since the TSA’s 
inception in 2001, through targeted marketing campaigns, exclusive websites 
devoted to soliciting activity and interest, and advertising its support in obtaining 
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higher wages, more fairly structured work schedules and grievance procedures. 
In anticipation of and subsequent to its victory of exclusive representation of 
TSOs, the AFGE continued this strategic campaign by expressing its desire to 
bargain actively for those issues that matter the most to TSOs. This marketing 
campaign tugged at the emotional elements over which TSOs have expressed 
concern, and most recently their concern over the (perceived) repercussions of 
taking annual and sick leave. AFGE surveyed TSOs to identify their primary 
concerns, and pledged its commitment to bargaining for the elimination of leave 
abuse policy, improved training, job rotation assignments, transfers and 
furloughs. It is only necessary to look at TSA’s Idea Factory to validate the 
AFGE’s survey results; TSOs have been expressing their frustration over these 
issues for years. Additionally, the survey revealed their desire for childcare 
subsidies, TSA-paid parking, and additional storage for personal items at TSA 
facilities. This survey and the Idea Factory blogs clearly indicate that TSOs feel 
they have not been heard and lack a voice in the policies and procedures that 
directly affect their quality of work environment. Whether or not the AFGE can 
deliver on their promises remains to be seen, especially in light of the list of non-
negotiable issues prescribed by Administrator Pistole. What is clear, however, is 
that TSOs perceive that TSA leadership has not listened to its workforce and has 
not included its workforce to the degree necessary to identify, address and 
resolve their concerns. Leadership’s avoidance of listening to the TSOs, coupled 
with the increasing negative media coverage of TSA’s screening policies and 
procedures, have created a premium platform from which the AFGE advanced its 
strategic recruitment campaign.  
In 2006, TSA designed the Idea Factory, a web-based system that 
enables all TSA employees to post their ideas for improving the agency. Over 
time, the Idea Factory has morphed into a blog whereby TSOs make their voices 
heard about issues, such as converting from the current pay system to the 
traditional General Schedule (GS) pay scale, increased uniform allowance, 
fairness in leave approval process, and a more balanced seniority system. For 
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years, TSOs have voiced their disapproval with these and other concerns, and 
provided hundred of ideas for improvement. Unfortunately, many of these 
concerns remain unchanged and TSOs continue to perceive their voices are not 
heard and changes are not made or are made without their input. As employee 
concerns continue to go unrecognized, they begin to be perceived as abusive 
incidents that will frame the perceptions of the group. Over time, these constructs 
become internalized to define the perceived reality that management and 
leadership do not care about the well-being and livelihood of their employees. 
Having a voice in the policy and procedure development is a win-win situation for 
both employees and management. Employees feel their voices are heard, and, 
more importantly, valued, whereby providing reassurance and security for 
management that the mission is being accomplished. 
Albert O. Hirschman developed the theory that, when confronted with 
deteriorating satisfaction, individuals will either leave or remain to voice their 
dissatisfaction in the hopes of enacting change. Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty theory (1970) was originally applied to economic principles and political 
arenas to understand why consumers may choose one product over another, or 
why citizens may choose one candidate over another. However, this theory can 
be applied to examine the psychological affecting employee behaviors. For 
example, when employees’ ideas and input are not solicited or considered, under 
Hirschman’s theory, they have three paths from which to choose when faced with 
dissatisfaction: they can leave or remain and use their voices to enact change. 
The latter option, Hirschman argues, is driven by loyalty to the organization or 
mission, through a sense of patriotism or commitment 
Voice theory needs two conditions to achieve its objectives—tradeoff 
between possible improvements and exiting (leaving the company), and a belief 
that their voice will be heard. This sense of loyalty plays a critical role in an 
individual’s cognitive behaviors because through this loyalty individuals will view 
exiting as too costly, and therefore, place an inflated sense of importance and 
inflated hope on the changes their (collective) voice may bring.  
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In the case of the TSA, TSOs have a choice to exit the organization or use 
their collective voices to enact change. In the current economic conditions facing 
many Americans, it may be argued that an exit approach is unlikely, as TSOs are 
paid competitive wages and receive generous benefit packages, relative to the 
private sector. To counter this argument, however, the TSA has one of the 
highest attrition rates of any federal agency. 
Why then would a disgruntled TSO choose voice over exit? “The 
effectiveness of the voice mechanism is strengthened by the possibility of exit 
(Hirschman, 1970, p. 83). The fear of continued attrition rates may have been a 
consideration by TSA Administrator John Pistole when he agreed to allowing 
TSOs the opportunity to voice for exclusive union representation.  
 53
V. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Unlike private sector businesses, government entities have little incentive 
to place a cap on increased labor costs the result from generous collective 
bargaining agreements. Lawmakers are inclined to give these workers what they 
want, regardless of the cost consequences. Their immediate political gains are 
increased constituent support and campaign funding, while passing the financial 
burden on to future generations long after these politicians have left office.  
AFL-CIO President and University of Idaho professor Nick Gier19 claims, 
“the rise of unions is a natural extension of representative democracy in the 
workplace, driven by an undeniable logic that workers should be able to protect 
their interests where they work as well as where they live.” Unions should be 
seen as a rightful part of U.S. democracy, and embraced as evidenced in 
European counterparts. The real parody, he argues, is the “lack of commitment 
of representative government” in that the U.S. government and legislators do not 
fully support the labor movement. U.S. labor laws are diverse and conflicting at 
federal, state and local levels, without regard to any federal jurisdictional power. 
Legislators simply pay lip service to their support of labor unions when doing so 
will bring political support to their campaigns, Gier argues.  
A. OPTION 1: IMPOSE LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON FEDERAL 
PUBLIC SECTOR UNION RIGHTS 
Diminishing the collective bargaining rights of federal employees poses 
significant legal ramifications. While federal agencies, such as the TSA, have the 
authority to prohibit collective bargaining rights based on the extensive authority 
granted under ATSA, such limitations are rare for other federal agencies. Siegel 
(2011) points out that these legislative and legal authorities that have granted 
collective bargaining are the result of politics designed to expand the clout of 
                                            
19 Response to an editorial in the Moscow-Pullman Daily News (June 15–16, 1996).  
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these unions whose interests are generally not aligned with those of the citizens 
at large. Reversing these decisions will be difficult, but not impossible, Siegel 
claims. As political climates change with presidential administrations and majority 
holds in the House and Senate, so shifts the mindset and tolerance for or against 
these special interests. Undoubtedly, this option is wrought with challenges and 
obstacles, however, not impossible as legislation moods have shifted over time 
to propose and oppose public sector collective bargaining, as demonstrated 
through the various legislation and Executive Orders since the early 1900s. 
B. OPTION 2: DECERTIFYING PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS 
PATCO pushed the envelope in 1981, and subsequently, was decertified 
by President Reagan because of their organized work strike that virtually halted 
aviation traffic in the United States. According to McCartin, the PATCO actions 
and the Reagan reaction led to a diminished union influence over management 
and political supporters. Regardless of federal statutes that prohibit federal 
employees from work strikes or slowdowns, the members of PATCO pushed the 
boundaries of these laws and tested the waters for future federal employees. 
President Reagan called their bluff, and subsequently, fired all PATCO members 
who engaged in the strike, banned them from all future federal employment and 
decertified the PATCO union.  
Wisconsin took the dramatic approach of reversing decades of pro-union 
legislation by passing its Budget Repair Bill, which in essence, decertified20 the 
state’s public sector unions. While the governor of any state does not have the 
authority to decertify a union, Governor Walker’s legislation made it impossible 
for public sector unions to collectively bargain for wage or benefit increases, 
which represent the bread-and-butter of union successes. Under Wisconsin’s 
new law, unions must undergo annual recertification, which means it must hold 
an election and receive 51% of votes from all bargaining unit employees, not just 
                                            
20 The intent of decertification is to remove the union as the exclusive representative with the 
authority to negotiate for all employees.  
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those who voted. Previously, public sector unions held their collective union 
power and status indefinitely. Unions had until September 22, 2011 to file for 
recertification status. On September 21, 2011, only three small unions had filed 
their intent to recertify, while the larger unions representing tens of thousands 
state workers will have lost their official union status. This change was 
instrumental in tamping the unions’ political influence as it virtually stripped the 
unions of their monopoly status.  
Public sector union decertification is gaining momentum across the 
country, in states like Wisconsin, New Jersey and Indiana. On his first day in 
office, Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels reversed the Executive Order enacted by 
his Democrat predecessor that granted collective bargaining rights to 
government workers. He also instituted a pay-for-performance merit plan for 
these workers, despite strong union opposition, and required strong justification 
to replace vacant positions. The state’s payroll fell from 35,000 employees to just 
below 30,000 within the first year. These once heavily unionized states are 
realizing that the substantial financial burden these collective bargaining 
agreements are placing on their over-burdened budgets, and seeking creative 
alternative solutions like union decertification to curb the rising cost of labor for 
current and future taxpayers..  
C. OPTION 3: CONTINUATION OF TSA’S CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
INITIATIVES 
Immediately following the administrator’s decision, TSA leadership began 
a new process of “union thinking.” Specifically, this paradigm shift included 
engaging the union in all employee-impacted issues, and not just management 
rights-based matters. By recognizing the union, they recognized that the TSA 
workforce before 2011 is no longer. The AFGE is now an extension of the 
workforce. This transitional process began with a comprehensive assessment of 
current policies and procedures that address the bargaining topics approved by 
Administrator Pistole and what it will take to implement a bargaining unit at the 
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TSA. This work continued with a review of all Management, Operational and 
Security Directives that regulate the specific topics that Administrator Pistole has 
determined eligible for collective bargaining consideration, such as resolution 
dispute procedures, uniform and grooming standards, shift bid and leave 
seniority process. Additionally, TSA brought key leadership and subject matter 
experts into the pre-decisional process to identify potential shortfalls and 
weaknesses contained in the existing policies that could develop into lengthy 
negotiations.  
In the coming months, as the TSA and AFGE work toward a workable 
collective bargaining agreement, leadership must recognize the significant 
amount of time and resources required to address union grievances and issues 
and allocate resources and adjust screener and management staffing levels 
necessary to fill these roles. Union representatives are on “official time” when 
conducting union business, yet are being paid by the TSA but not conducting 
actual screening duties. TSA leadership must recognize the impact this time-
consuming process will have on its ability to meet the mission by having paid 
personnel not conducting TSA business, the need to shift these non-union tasks 
to other TSA personnel, and the labor-intensive process that management may 
experience when dealing with the union issues. 
Through continued advanced preparation, TSA leadership will be 
positioned to sit at the bargaining table having done their homework in 
anticipation of the union’s positional power and bargaining agenda. After the 
negotiations are complete and the collective bargaining agreement signed, the 
TSA should continue with its change management process by consistently 
recognizing that the culture, climate and workforce that stood up the TSA in 2001 
has been replaced with a labor relations mentality and unionized workforce.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The intent of this thesis was to present a framework for understanding the 
public sector union environment, how it differs from the private sector, some 
underlying causes of the recent spike in public sector union membership, and the 
current and future financial impact to federal, state and local budgets. Through 
examining and comparing case studies of PATCO, the TSA, the states of 
Wisconsin and New Jersey, and Seattle’s IAFF Union Local 27, the objective was 
to substantiate the hypothesis with fair and balanced research. At the conclusion 
of the author’s research and literature review, most notable was the impossibility 
of a one-size-fits-all solution.  
The TSA suffers one of the highest voluntary attrition rates of any federal 
agency, reported at 17% by the Department of Homeland Security Office of 
Inspector General report (Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector 
General, 2008). The job of a TSO is difficult and stressful as TSO deals with the 
traveling public, emerging threats and an ever-increasing industry. For over 10 
years, TSOs have felt their voices were not heard and had little-to-no input into 
critical decisions about security procedures, employee benefits and 
compensations or work schedules. The AFGE may be able to provide these 
advantages, and together with TSA leadership, forge a more productive and 
effective security environment for the nation. Opponents of this transition to a 
unionized TSO workforce argue that the price to pay is too high, and the risks too 
great. Proponents claim that a motivated, better-trained and better-paid 
workforce will emerge, and subsequently, contribute to aviation security.  
A workforce strike or slowdown at the TSA could cripple an already-fragile 
aviation economy. TSA leadership has taken monumental steps toward ensuring 
a smooth transition to a unionized workforce. By sending a clear and convincing 
message that the TSA will not negotiate on security measures, the TSA has 
taken the first critical step to establishing a professional working relationship with 
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the AFGE as it works toward establishing consensus on the national collective 
bargaining agreement. PATCO’s efforts to make air traffic safer and bring a level 
of professionalism to the occupation were overplayed when it turned its back on 
President Reagan’s offer of higher pay and instead opted to stage a nationwide 
strike. McCartin argues that PATCO’s demise was the turning point in America’s 
sympathy for labor unions, and an end to the political support for government 
unions. President Obama campaigned on the promise of unionizing the TSOs 
and granting them collective bargaining rights and he has delivered on that 
promise. While many have opined, nobody can accurately predict the degree of 
success or failure of that decision or the probability of a work strike or slowdown 
should the AFGE and TSA reach an impasse in their current or future bargaining 
efforts. The TSA is working hard to forge an advantageous path in establishing 
the terms and foundation for a successful partnership with AFGE. History has 
demonstrated, through the actions of PATCO and Toronto’s screening workforce 
slowdown, the repercussions of an aviation security slowdown or strike could 
have catastrophic effects on homeland security and cripple an already-fragile 
aviation economy—one that has just begun to dig out of the depths of the 9/11 
tragedy.  
Table 2.   Median Weekly Earnings Of Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers by 
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783 957 948 746 802 980 955 759




887 1,010 996 782 913 1,023 1,008 811
Arts, design, 
entertainment, 
sports, and media 
occupations 





970 1,089 1,070 952 986 1,095 1,098 967
Service occupations 470 702 682 435 479 723 707 447
Healthcare support 
occupations 472 518 518 464 471 514 503 467
Protective service 
occupations 747 992 980 611 747 995 980 629
Food preparation 
and serving related 
occupations 





444 597 588 418 446 595 590 421
Personal care and 
service occupations 440 576 567 429 455 575 564 440
Sales and office 
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605 786 780 578 599 817 809 564
Production 




599 789 782 563 599 824 816 557
 
INDUSTRY 
Private sector 711 856 845 697 717 864 855 703
Agriculture and 
related industries 462 - - 457 465 - - 463
Nonagricultural 
industries 715 857 846 701 721 865 856 707
Mining, quarrying, 
and oil and gas 
extraction 
1,050 1,013 1,015 1,058 1,032 1,076 1,053 1,026
Construction 744 1,072 1,052 698 735 1,051 1,046 692
Manufacturing 767 800 799 762 767 828 817 759
Durable goods 806 836 832 801 806 878 866 796
Nondurable goods 706 735 741 698 700 760 749 690
Wholesale and retail 
trade 611 648 641 609 612 669 657 610



















Retail trade 577 612 607 575 575 613 608 572
Transportation and 
utilities 798 975 964 748 823 1,000 994 765
Transportation and 
warehousing 749 923 911 707 765 934 928 725
Utilities 1,043 1,120 1,104 1,008 1,102 1,199 1,193 1,014
Information(4) 905 1,105 1,083 883 912 1,018 998 895
Publishing, except 
Internet 847 - - 843 876 - - 871
Motion pictures and 
sound recording 
industries 
1,047 - - 924 917 - - 893




827 - - 828 821 - - 814
Telecommunications 964 1,095 1,079 924 987 1,039 1,023 974
Financial activities 839 843 831 839 849 806 799 852
Finance and 
insurance 881 845 837 882 902 819 829 905
Finance 889 842 817 892 902 - 870 903
Insurance 868 - - 868 902 - - 908
Real estate and 
rental and leasing 726 842 822 718 702 786 713 701
Professional and 
business services 864 761 748 868 855 751 754 859
Professional and 




560 658 640 553 542 598 592 536
Education and 
health services $715 $839 $838 $698 $731 $849 $846 $717
Educational services 819 886 879 795 852 900 875 846
Health care and 
social assistance 685 801 802 673 698 817 823 686
Leisure and 
hospitality 464 583 576 458 469 580 575 461
Arts, entertainment, 
and recreation 601 673 671 593 616 636 632 614
Accommodation and 



















Accommodation 505 582 582 496 508 547 553 502
Food services and 
drinking places 412 424 423 412 417 517 509 416




627 893 868 620 636 880 874 627
Public sector 865 947 943 782 878 961 956 801
Federal government 1,002 981 989 1,019 1,012 977 987 1,040
State government 829 906 899 767 829 922 917 769
Local government 834 956 948 720 854 971 962 743
Footnotes 
(1) Data refer to members of a labor union or an employee association similar to a union. 
(2) Data refer to both union members and workers who report no union affiliation but whose jobs are covered 
by a union or an employee association contract. 
(3) Data refer to workers who are neither members of a union nor represented by a union on their job. 
(4) Includes other industries, not shown separately. 
- Data not shown where base is less than 50,000. 
NOTE: Data refer to the sole or principal job of full- and part-time wage and salary workers. All self-employed 
workers are excluded, both those with incorporated businesses as well as those with unincorporated 
businesses. Updated population controls are introduced annually with the release of January data.  
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